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IN THE 
SUPREME .COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT T. WAGNER and 
REBECCA L. WAGNER, _ 
his wife, 
Appellants., 
vs 
JOSEPH A. ANDERSON, 
Respondent. 
Civil No. 7761 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In view of the fact that Appellants' Statement 
of Facts includes certain allegations and contentions 
of Appellants therein denominated as Facts, which 
Respondent can not agree to, Re~pondent contends 
that the following are the essential facts for a deter-
mination of this appeal. 
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4 
On August 11, 1951, Appellants filed a Com-
plaint against the Respondent (Tr. 1) in which, 
among other things, they sought specific perform-
• . 
ance of a real estate contract, attorney's fees and 
spe.cial damages. On August 25, 1951, Respondent 
served upon Appellants a written notice of intention 
to proceed with the contract, and wherein he tender-
ed to Appellants the purchase price for the property 
(Tr. 19). 
On or about August 31, 1951, Appellants ac-
cepted the purchase price for said property and con-
veyed their interest therein to the Respondent. Dur-
ing the interval between s_aid tender and conveyance 
negotiations were had between the parties in which 
Appellants' attorney stated Appellants would not 
dismiss the action unless the attorney's fee and dam-
ages were settled. Respondent's attorneys com-
mented in substance that if the action were not dis-
missed the parties would be required to have the 
matter heard and dete:nnined by the Court. 
On September 10, 1951, Respondent filed an 
Amended Motion to Dismiss (Tr. 12) which was 
heard on September 13, 1951, and granted by the 
Court, and a written Order of Dismissal made and 
entered on September 15, 1951 (Tr. 22). There-
after, on September 19, 1951, Appellants filed a 
Motion for rehearing ( Tr. 18) which was supported 
by :Affidavits of W. W. Kirton, Jr. (Tr. 14) and 
Lothaire R. Rich (Tr. 16). Respondent filed a 
counter affidavit (Tr. 20). A hearing was had on, 
said motion for rehearing which was denied by the 
Court. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I 
The Court did not err in dismissing the Com-
plaint. 
ARGUMENT 
This is an action,for specific performance of a 
real estate contract. Included in the Complaint is a 
claim for attorney's fees and special damage. After 
the Complaint had been filed Respondent served a 
notice on Appellants indic·ating his willingness to 
proceed with the contract, and wherein he tendered 
the purchase price to them. The Appellants accepted 
the purchase money and conveyed their interest in 
the property to Respondent. 
Respondent contends that ,by accepting the pur-
chase money and conveying the property Appellants' 
cause of action was extinguished and the attorneys' 
fee and damages, being mere incidents thereto, were 
likewise extinguished, and the Court had no further 
jurisdiction in the cause than to dismiss the action. 
If a tree falls because it is cut off at the roots the 
branches must also fall. 
There is no question but what the Court may, 
under certain circumstances, award damages in lieu 
of specific performance, as indicated by the cases 
cited on Page 9 of Appellants' Brief, but in none of 
those cases was there a satisfaction of the specific 
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performance phase of the law suit and thus they are 
not in point so far as the question now before this 
Court is concerned. 
Appellants apparently place great, reliance on 
the case of Hall, vs. Great American Insurance Co.· 
252 N. W. 763, cited on Page 10 of their Brief. In 
the Hall case the claimant in an action against an 
insurance company for a fire loss dismiss.ed a Com-
plaint for everything in the policy, except that he 
reserved his right to claim a loss for a diamond stud, 
which claim the Court held he was able to pursue 
against the contention of the insurance company that 
he could not split his cause of action and pursue it · 
piecemeal. The Hall case can readily be distin-
guished from the case at bar. · In the Hall case the 
claim for the diamond stud was a part of the cause of 
action itself, and by dismissing the Complaint as to 
the other items the claimant merely eliminated them 
·from the cause of action, but he still had a cause of 
action left with respect to the diamond stud. Where-
as, in the case at bar the cause of action which the 
Appellants sued upon was for specific performance. 
The attorneys' fee and ·special damages were merely 
incidents thereof and were not ~eparate. items of a 
cause of action which could be sued upon alone. By 
acceptance of the purchase price and making a con-
veyance of the property the Appellants extinguished 
their cause. The claim for attorneys' fee and dam-
ages, being mere incidents thereto, were extinguish-
ed when the cause itself was gone. The authorities 
support th~s position. 
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A case very similar to the one at bar, in that it 
was a suit for specific performance, is that of Pr~ 
Shoop Family Medicine Co. vs. Showalter, 98 N. W. 
940 (Wis.). This was an action in equity brought to 
compel the specific performance of a contract. The 
Plaintiff claimed an Agreement had been made be-
tween Plaintiff and Defendant whereby for a com-
mission of $50.00 the.Defendant was to purchase cer-
tain property in his own name for the Plaintiff. The 
Defendant purchased the property for $1375.00, 
'vhich sum the Plaintiff thereafter paid, but Defen-
dant refused to convey the same to the Plaintiff. The 
Defendant filed a Counter Claim in which he claimed 
certain amounts were owing to him totaling $175.00 
and offered_ to convey the property upon payment of 
that sum. The matter was submitted to the jury for 
·an advisory verdict. After the jury returned aver-
dict in favor of Plaintiff the Plaintiff moved for 
Findings and judgment in favor. The Defendant-
objected upon the ground that a settlement of the 
controversy had been had by the parties wherein the 
Plaintiff ~ad paid the De~endant $50.00 and the De-
fendant had delivered a deed to the property to him. 
In discussing this point the Appellate Court said on 
Page ~41: 
"We can not but regard this as a voluntary 
settlement of the controversy by the parties 
pending the litigation and the only remaii).ing 
question is as to the effect of the settlement up-
on the litigation itself. Upon this question the 
conclusion qf the trial Court seems to have been 
that there was a complete loss of jurisdiction 
and that the action can never be disposed of, but 
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must be left forever hanging between Heaven 
and earth like Mohamet's coffin. This was cer-
tainly an erroneous idea.' Although there was no 
jurisdiction to try the controversy because the 
controversy had passed out of existance, still 
there was jurisdiction left in the Court to dis-
miss both the Complaint and the Counter Claim 
because the controversy had been settled. Where 
no controversy exists a court will dismiss the 
action for that very reason. Williams, vs. Wil-
liams, 117 Wis. 125, 94 N. W. 25. So while the 
Court was right in refusing to make Findings 
and Judgment for the Plaintiff upon its origi-
nal cause of action jt was wrong in holding that 
there was no jurisdiction in the Court to enter 
any judgment and wrong in denying the mo-
tion to dismiss -the Counter Claim. Judgment 
should have been entered dismissing both the 
Complaint and the Counter Claim. There could 
be no costs properly granted to either party up-
on the dismissal, because both causes of action 
had been entirely extinguished by the settle-
ment. Except in case of some express statutory 
provision an extinguishment of the entire cause 
of action by settlement pending the action with 
no 1nention of costs, extinguishes the right to 
costs. Geiser T. M. Co. vs. Smith, 36 Wis. 295, 
17 Am. St. Rep. 494. Two Rivers Manufactur-
ing Co. vs. Beyer, 74 Wis. 210,42 N. W. 232, 17 
Am. St. Rep. 131. Cernahan, vs, Chrisler, 107 
Wis. 645, 83 N. W. 778. It seems best to reverse 
·the entire order and direct the proper judg-
ment." (Emphasis Ours.) 
A case involving attorneys' fees and costs is 
Cloquet, vs. ·Department of Labor and Industries of 
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"\V ashington, 268 Pac. 602 (Wash.) . In this case 
the appellant sustained an injury in the course of his 
employment fQr which he claimed workmen's com-
pensation. .-\.fter monthly payments had been made 
the department attempted to termin~te the amount 
of compensation by making an order to that effect, 
which \vas appealed from to the Superior Court. 
Mter the appeal had been taken the department 
made further arrangement for payment of monthly 
compensation and about a year later a settlement 
was made in which he was given an award of 
$900.00. After the settlement had been made the 
appellant attempted to appeal from the first order 
wherein he claims that he should be entitled to at-
torney's fees and costs. The Appellate Court denied 
such recovery and discussed the question as follows: 
"(2-4) Appellant also argues that, if his 
appeal was well taken the judgment of the court 
reversing the department would have allowed to 
him costs and attorneys' fees, and seems to con-
tend that notwithstanding the settlement with 
the department by which he secured cancella-
tion of its order and a reinstatement of his pre-
vious classificatio:Q, withj all of the benefits 
flowing therefrom, which he had accepted and 
retained, he may now proceed to trail, use that 
settlement as proof that the cancelled order 
was erroneous, and now recover his costs and at-
torneys' fees. Such a proceeding would be wholly 
inequitable. Moreover, when litigants compose 
their differences and wipe out the subject of the 
litigation, nothing being said about costs and 
attorneys' fees, it is to be presumed that each 
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party will bear his own, and in any event, when 
the subject matter of a lawsuit/is by agreement 
of. the parties finally and fully settled,. the 
courts will not further retain jurisdiction for 
the purpose of deciding questions relating to 
costs. 
"Judgment is affirmed." (Emphasis ours.) 
Another case which sets out the principle in un-
mistaken language. is Two Rivers Manufacturing 
Company, vs. Beyer, 74 Wis, 210~ 17 Am. St. Rep. · 
131, wherein it was held in an action to foreclose a 
tax lien where, during the pendency of the suit the 
Plaintiff accepted the full amount of the lien, that 
his cause of action was thereby terminated and that 
a judgment rendered thereafter for costs was void. 
In discus~ing that the Court says on Page 136: 
''The tax certificates were the cause of action 
, and the full cause of action of that suit of fore-
closure. They are to be foreclosed in the same 
manner as mortgages ( R. S. Sec. 1181) and 
are the cause of action the same· as mortgages 
are the cause of· action in suits of foreclosure. 
The redemptio~ of the lands from the certifi-
cates pending the suit in foreclosure must have 
the same effect upon the suit as the payment of 
the mortgages or the redemption of the lands 
from the mortgages pending suits for their fore-
closure. In both cases respectively the tax certifi-· 
cates and the mortgages are the subject matters 
of the suits. The sole object of the suits is to 
foreclose them and the sole result is the judg-
ment of foreclosure. The suit is brought upon 
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them and on account of them alone ... In all· 
possible respects they are the same as any other 
cause of action such as a promissory note or a 
bond for the payment of money, for trespass or 
damage, feasant or any other which may be 
satisfied or discharged· by the payment ·of 
money and for which a judgment may be rend-
ered. There could be no action without such a 
cause or some cause of action. When such a 
cause no longer exists there is no longer any 
cause of action and the action is at an end. An 
action could not continue as an action when the 
cause has been removed~ any more than an ac-
tion could be commenced without a cause of ac-
tion. The costs are merely incidental to an 
action based on a sufficient cause of action, and 
are not part of it, but the creature of the statute 
which can only follow a judgment or final deter-
mination of an action in which the cause of ac-
tion is merged. An action can not be brought 
merely for the costs thereof, nor can an action be 
maintained after the cause of action has been 
removed merely· for the costs thereof, for then 
they would be no longer incidental, but the prin-
cipal of the suit. Can an action be commenced 
to foreclose a mortgage, or tax certificate, or on 
a note or bond, or for tresspass after the mort-
gage or tax certificate has been redeemed, or the 
note or bond had ·been paid and the trespass 
satisfied and the money had been accepted by 
the Plaintiff? No more can such actions subsist 
and continue to a judgment after such redemp-
tion, payment or satisfaction had been acknow-
ledged by the acceptance of the money. The ac-
tion is ended when the cause of action is taken 
out of it." 
I I I 
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Another case, Obert, vs. Zahn, 145 Pac. 403 
·(Okla.), was one for unlawful detainer. After the 
action was filed the Defendant yielded possession of 
the premises, which were accepted by the Plaintiff. 
The Appellate Court held that by Plaintiff having 
~ccepted possession of the premises the Court lost 
jurisdiction of the matter and had no power to enter 
judgment for possession or costs. The Court quoted 
the language from Two Rivers Manufacturing Com-
pany, vs. Beyer, supra.· The Court also quoted from 
the case of Geiser Threshing Machine Co. vs. Smith, 
et · al, 36 Wis. 295, 17 Am. St. Rep. 494, which is an 
action on a promissory note wherein attorneys' fees 
and costs were involved. The excerpt is as follows: 
"The facts were that on March 17, 1873, sum-
mons and complaint in the action were delivered 
to the sheriff with intent to have the same ser-
ved upon the defendant; that before service de-
fendant paid plaintiff's attorney the principal 
and interest on the note in full, who accepted 
the money, but claimed $17.00 costS; whereup-
on, defendant refusing to pay, a surrender of 
the note was refused upon that ground. Ser-
vice was thereafter had. 'The note contained an 
agreement to pay plaintiff 5 per cent for attor-
ney's fees if suit was brought thereon. On this 
state of facts there was judgment for plaintiff 
for costs, from which defendants appealed. In 
reversing the case the court said it was not nec-
es~ary to decide when the suit was commenced: 
"Because, whether it was commenced or not, 
the acceptance by the plaintiffs of full payment 
of the amount due on the note extinguished 
their right to prosecute it. It may be that the 
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plaintiffs might have refused the payment _and 
prosecuted the suit to judgment for damages 
and costs. But they could not receive the dam-
ages and reserve the right to prosecute the suit" 
for costs. Canfield v. School District, 19 Conn. 
529; Ayer v. Ashmead, 31 Conn. 44 7 ( 83 Am. 
Dec. 154); Buell vs. Flower, 39 Conn. 462 (12 
Am. Rep. 414)." 
Many other cases are quoted in the Zahn case, 
and the Court concludes as follows: 
"We are therefore of opinion,-when- pendente 
lite defendant yielded possession of the property 
in controversy, as he did, that there was left re-
maining no issue to try; that the court lost jur-
isdiction of the subject matter, and hence could 
render no judgment affecting the same, and 
there being no agreement as_ to the costs, erred_ 
in taxing the same against defendant." 
CONCLUSION 
The Court did not err in dismissing the Com-
plaint, and its Judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROMNEY, BOYER & BERTOCH 
Attorneys for Respondent 
1409 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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